Hello Wedge (Part II): Princess
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s we have seen, the ADO17 did not have a particularly distinguished career as BMC's flagship front-wheel-drive model. Sales were disappointing because the car – which possessed a great deal of potential – simply did not appeal to the target buyers. Even though the car was an unreserved sales flop, BMC undertook no work into replacing the car, which meant that it would be down to Leyland to formulate plans – and because it was younger than the ADO16, it would have to take second place to it. Once Donald Stokes had finalised the company's plans in the lower-mid-range, attention was finally turned to the ADO17 and how best to replace it. Initial thoughts on the matter were put down on paper by Filmer Paradise on the 27th February 1970 (some six years after the launch of the ADO17) which was contained in a confidential memorandum, submitted to the members of the Product Policy Committee.

Echoing the thoughts of John Barber, Paradise made it clear that the main growth in the car market would be in the upper-medium sector, referred to as the “D Class” (which back in 1970 referred to anything over 1500cc) and that as the ADO17 badly needed replacing, it would make sense to pitch its replacement further upmarket. This plan was, in the opinion of Paradise, one that Austin-Morris most urgently needed to instigate and that the resultant car should be European-influenced in order to effectively meet the challenges of the late-seventies.

The initial thoughts were that the car should be rear wheel drive and have “European” styling, but the decision to continue with front wheel drive was swiftly (and correctly) made by the Product Planning, who felt that the ADO17 chassis and engine/transmission pack would make an ideal base for the new car. Besides, changing over to rear wheel drive would send out confused signals to the car buying public and the company that did so much in pioneering front wheel drive for the masses should stick to this format. At this time, the car was given the project name “Diablo”, which encompassed another car already in development.

Once the mechanical packaging of the car was settled, the finer details were looked at – and the ADO71 became a more serious study. The initial thoughts were that the 1750cc version of the E-series engine would be the entry-level power pack, which had the advantage over the B-series powered ADO17 of having a five-speed gearbox – and the higher models would use the E6 engine, already employed in the older car, but with the added update of a five-speed gearbox. The body of the car could be allowed to grow, in order to match the Opel Rekord, Peugeot 504 or Ford Cortina MkIII, but more importantly, to facilitate a less upright driving position, allow a larger boot than the ADO17 and improve the car's crash-worthiness. Importantly, because the ADO17 was a tremendously commodious car and the ADO71 was based upon it, it would have class-leading passenger space.

Original Harris Mann sketch shows just exactly where the lineage of the ADO71 originated. This sketch, produced for Project Condor in 1969, shows just how much Harris Mann believed in the wedge shape. The squared off wheel arches and air extractor at the base of the C-post also show hints of Allegro, which he had worked on the previous year.

BL Board approval was given to the ADO71 at this point and development of the car now continued apace. The man chosen to create a look for the ADO71 was Harris Mann, who had previously worked on the Morris Marina and created the Austin Allegro – and since the BLMC design studio had been moved from Cowley to Longbridge in 1970, had replaced Roy Haynes in overall charge of car design. Back in 1969, after Mann had been asked to create a design for a sports car of the future (which ended up as the BL Zanda, a good-looking design exercise for a sports coupe that had been presented to the press at the Earls Court motor show), he was asked to produce a saloon in the same vein. Unlike the Zanda, which made it to full-size show prototype, the saloon car was nothing more than a paper study, but the drawings were issued as part of a press release.

The saloon concept caught the attention of upper management and so, Mann was asked to develop the concept further. The idea was that the futuristic proposal completely captured the spirit of the upmarket aspirations that the company had for the ADO71 and so the styling work that Harris Mann had been working on was now transferred to this project.

Harris Mann worked on “production-ising” his concept and within weeks, the design department had produced a full-sized version of the car, which unlike the Austin Allegro, even at this early stage in its design process was translating into an interesting a good-looking design. Notable Harris Mann trademarks were the pronounced “wedge” shape (something that became increasing popular throughout the Seventies) incorporating a long and low front-end, high rear end and fastback rear. Some notable design points were the concealed windscreen wipers and towards the rear of the roofline, there was a raised section which added usefully the amount of downforce generated aerodynamically by the car. The initial study for the ADO71, which was still clearly named Diablo, actually incorporated a hatchback rear end and this feature would have enabled the ADO71 to fit-in nicely with upcoming rivals, such as the Audi 100 Avant and Renault 20.

First clay model, completed in November 1970 at Longbridge shows that unlike the Allegro, the lines of the Princess made it from concept to production reality without too much corruption from the production engineers. Harris Mann is stood to the far left in this picture.

By December 1970, the BL Board had viewed the clay model and digested the technical specification and marketing plans and without too much procrastination, decided to give the ADO71 the go-ahead for full-scale production.

Initial viewings of the ADO71 were conducted at Longbridge alongside its predecessor. This picture demonstrates just how much the contrast between old and new really was. One aspect of Harris Mann's “wedge” design was that it afforded excellent interior room whilst maintaining relatively short overhangs – something that continued BMC traditions of old.

Some fairly wide-ranging decisions needed to be made with regards to the production of the car: the first of which was the dropping of the plan for the lead-in model to use the E-series engine in single carburettor form. This decision was easily made because going on sales projections forwarded by management, the Allegro and Maxi would all-but use-up the entire capacity of Cofton Hackett and so, the B-series unit would continue to be used in this application. The single carburettor version of the E-series engine was also considerably less powerful than the 'B and because the ADO71 would emerge only slightly less weighty than the ADO17, it was felt that the newer engine would be less-than ideal anyway. Long term planning also meant that this decision needed to be made because the upcoming O-series engine was in the pipeline and back in 1971, this was still seen as a straightforward OHC conversion of the B-series and using the older engine in the ADO71 meant that the conversion to the O-series (assuming the engine was not available launch) would be a relatively straightforward affair.

Two stages of ADO71 development. Left: The final clay model is analysed by a DEA computer for in order to produce an exact set of dimensions - this process will produce the digrams that will then go to Pressed Steel Fisher so that they can produce the body panels for the new car.
Right: This development model is used for producing a final interior. If you look closely, you can just see a proposal for ADO73, a frontally facelifted Marina that never appeared.
(Pictures supplied by rovauk@yahoo.com)

It was at this early stage in proceedings that the questionable decision to offer the ADO71 as a saloon and not a hatchback was made. As we shall see, there was a simple reason for this, but BLMC's marketeers touted a string of alternative explanations, none of which got anywhere near the truth:

Product planners felt that in the class that the car was aimed at, a hatchback was seen as being somewhat out of place (despite what Rover was doing at Solihull with the SD1 at the same time). The hatchback concept was being seen exclusively as the province of the small car, whereas the ADO71 was conceived to replace not only ADO17, but the Austin 3-Litre as well. Besides, BLMC was already well-served in the middle market with their hatchback Maxi; they did not want the new car to take sales away from it.

The Engineering Department was also encouraged to shy away from creating the car as five-door model because it would have added extra weight and complexity, with only marginal improvements in accommodation. Market research for BLMC also indicated that a saloon was what customers wanted. Of course, the reality showed that by not producing a hatchback, the company may have done themselves out of sales, especially in Europe – the subsequent popularity of the format showed how wrong Austin-Morris was (certainly the sales success of the SD1 was not impaired because it was a hatchback).

The reality was that the Princess never received a hatchback because, as one senior insider at the time put it, "...I believe there was some politics about not conflicting with SD1. [A bit odd really, given that we'd had the Maxi since 1969, and 'executive hatchbacks' were still a bit daring.] There was a definite tendency to push Austin-Morris feature levels down from whatever Rover were proposing, instead of letting each model range achieve its best level on straight economics." This story would also be echoed during the development of the Rover SD1 in relation to Jaguar.

Charles Griffin was placed in charge of developing the chassis of the ADO71 and the question of what system was to be used was an easy one to answer. Hydragas, as first seen in the Allegro was the obvious choice, differing only in detail from it in the set-up of its front suspension, which actually mirrored the Maxi. To ensure pliant ride, the spring rates in this application were exceptionally soft, but to back this up, the unusual step was taken to design the ADO71 to use wide, low profile tyres on narrow wheel rims; relying on lower than usual tyre pressures and the resulting flexing of the tyres' sidewalls to add further ride softness. It has to be said that, if the intention was to achieve Citroen-like ride, the chassis engineers reached their aims very easily; the finished car had a ride quality that was almost in the same league as the Citroën CX – certainly, it had none of the bounciness that afflicted the Allegro.

Development work continued and some wind tunnel tuning of the shape was all that was felt to be needed, which must have been a relief to Harris Mann, who had seen his previous design, the Allegro corrupted on its way to production. The final shape that emerged was only slightly different from the original clay model of November, 1971 and its comparatively clean aerodynamic shape (co-efficient of drag was cd0.404 – not in the same league as the Citroën CX, but certainly better than the “domestic” opposition) was testament to the initial “rightness” of Mann's design. Accommodation was also marked out as a strong point; seat room was as good as the ADO17 up front, only slightly worse at the rear and most importantly, the driving position was far more reclined than the sit-up-and-beg ADO17.

In development, it is fair to say that all the aims set out for the car in 1970 were met – and a great deal of credit for this should be laid at the feet of Charles Griffin, who ensured that the ADO71 project did not lose sight of its objectives.

When the ADO71 was launched on March 26th 1975, just weeks before the publication of the Ryder Report, it did so to an enthusiastic press and public alike. Where there was a real sense of disappointment at the ugliness of the Allegro, the 18-22 Series as it was named, emerged a good-looking and interesting car. The dealers must have shared the same sense of relief, because whereas the Allegro sales never got close to matching the sales ADO16, there was a real feeling that the new car would comfortably outsell the ADO17. Certainly British Leyland's own forecasts reflected this view and the production facility at Cowley North works was greatly modernised with an increased production volume in mind.

Advert from March 1975 shows that seven years after the Leyland takeover, badge-engineering was still rife.

Mechanically, the ADO17 offered no great surprises, with its choice of B and E6-series engines, four speed gearboxes and Hydragas suspension – the O-series would have to wait for the first facelift. The press lauded the car for its impressive stability at speed, superior ride quality and well-sorted front wheel drive handling. Importantly, BL learned lessons from the ADO17 and fitted power assisted steering to the car, offering it as standard on the 2200 version and an optional extra on the 1800 – the fact was that the system made a huge difference to the driving experience and the heavy, low-geared manual set-up had dominated all driving impressions of the ADO17. Interior accommodation was predictably praised and dashboard ergonomics – never a strong point of the ADO17 – were described as, “futuristic”. The question of the styling was unanswered, but few disagreed with the sentiment at the time, that it was considerably more appealing than the Allegro, Maxi and the ADO17. When the morale at British Leyland, be it in the factories or the dealers, was at its lowest ebb, it was seen as genuinely good news that the company had something appealing to sell.

Indeed, after their test of the 2200HL of the 29th March 1975, Autocar summed up the car favourably, “All in all, this is a most satisfactory car, which should do much for Austin-Morris. We wish it well, and are confident that it will find wide favour with the both business man seeking a refined, comfortable mile eater and the family man who needs proper space for a growing brood.”

The new Austin-Morris 18-22 range together at launch: at the rear, the Austin, foreground right, the Morris and foreground left, the range-topping Wolseley. (Picture supplied by rovauk@yahoo.com)

What was left unsaid in the test was that the 110bhp 2200HL version was blessed with rather less than sparkling performance; much was made of the excellent stability, superb ride and strong brakes, but the straight line speed – or rather lack of it – was carefully glossed over. The figures told a rather stark story, though: 0-60mph in 13.5 seconds, a maximum speed of 104mph, 50-70 in fourth gear took a yawning 13.2 seconds and an overall fuel consumption figure of 20.7mpg. Most price rivals were significantly quicker and to the customers that the car was aimed at, this was important.

Marketing the car did pose some raise issues for the company's management, but the only problem was one of potential confusion in the minds of the cars customers. It would seem odd that after the proclamation given by Donald Stokes that the company would no longer enter into the practice of badge engineering, that the new car would appear in Austin, Morris and Wolseley guises. The marketing plan, however, dictated that it was necessary to launch the 18-22 Series badged three different ways because of the fact that after seven years in existence, British Leyland still operated independent Austin and Morris franchises. At the time of the launch of the 18-22 Series, the ADO77 Marina replacement was still only in the early stages of development, but back in 1971 when the decision was made to offer the ADO71 in three varieties, the Marina had just been launched and product planners knew that there would be no new Morris cars for a very long time.

Rightly, no thought was given to producing a rear wheel variation of the car to fit in with Donald Stokes' policy that there should be a range of rear wheel Morris cars to complement the front wheel drive Austins – even if it had, there were not enough resources in the company to pursue such a plan. Clearly the 18-22 with its advanced specification was an Austin in execution, but because producing it so would have left Morris dealers at a real disadvantage, only having the Mini and Marina to sell, it was decided to launch the car through both dealer networks – also ensuring that all sales possibilities were maximised.

Of course, the obvious answer was unify the Austin and Morris dealerships - a process that was slowly taking shape anyway, but the matter was finally brought to a close in September 1975, when the Austin-Morris 18-22 Series was renamed the Princess; an event which sadly closed the book on Wolseley. In response to the recommendations of the Ryder Report and its wish that there should be a “single unified” car company, the Princess name – a marque in its own right, apparently - was applied to the ADO71 range and used in much the same way as the Mini name had been since 1969. Now that the Austin-Morris Princess (or Leyland Princess, as it was known as by just about everyone) was firmly established on the market, it did not take long for the cracks to show.

Unreliability was a problem that had seemingly befell all British Leyland products since the Mini, but by 1975 the problem was so bad and so public, that when the Princess started to develop faults, they were national news. Nightmare stories of collapsing suspension and driveshaft failures did not help BL at all and the fact that the engineers took such a long time to eventually cure the problems only exacerbated the company's woes. Because the majority of British Leyland was now owned by the government and funded by tax-payers, special attention was paid to all aspects of the company and as the Princess was its newest product, it was attracting the most attention. Of course, the problem had been that BLMC rushed the introduction of the Princess: as one Cowley fitter put it, "the question of quality on the Princess was, in the beginning, really bad. The main problem was bad fit up of parts, and poor colour matching of internal trim. This improved fairly quickly once the launch of the car was done."

This immaculate Princess demonstrates perfectly the fact that the wedge profile made the transition from styling exercise to production reality without any major changes - contrast that with the sad story of how the Allegro was corrupted by the production engineers. This late model Princess sports Triumph Stag alloys and a strident yellow colour that suits the car perfectly. (Picture supplied by Peter Wood)

The company did all it could do, hamstrung by bloody-minded shop stewards and now-limited financial resources, so one of the immediate actions taken by them was to hire a new man, Brigadier Charles Maple, whose job it was to ensure that all quality was as tight as it could be within Austin-Morris. The fact that the Princess had failed so spectacularly and so publicly made it all the easier for Maple to get down to work and make his presence felt; to act as an effective quality overlord. Again, like the ADO17 before it – and the Austin Montego after it – this initial unreliability had predictable effects on consumer confidence in the Princess. People did not buy the Princess in large numbers; the sales never lived up to the expectations that British Leyland management had for it, but unlike the ADO17, which BMC left pretty much untouched for the duration of the production run, the Princess was the subject of a programme of continuous development.

One happy side-effect of the creation of the Princess marque was simplifying the production variations. Now that there was not the plethora of Austin, Morris and Wolseley models to contend with, the quality soon improved: "The other problem was the product mix, i.e. low-line, medium-line and high-line trim levels. This was on the Austin and Morris versions. Many wrong parts were fitted to the early cars just to make up the numbers for launch. Once the 18-22 series was dropped and the Princess name came in and the trim levels when to low-line [L], high-line [HL] and high-line super [HLS], things improved no end."

Interestingly, a run of 50 diesel-powered Princesses was produced during 1977, with the sole intent of recapturing the private-hire taxi market, which had been all but surrendered to Ford. Although these B-series diesels were trialled across the country, the plan was soon dropped. The one contribution the Princess 1800D did make to the overall story of the car was the improved bulkhead insulation, which would find its way onto the Princess 2, improving refinement levels considerably.

In July 1978, the Princess 2 finally appeared, sporting the new O-series engine, which was available in 1.7 and 2-litre forms to run alongside the existing 2227cc E6 power unit (the six cylinder would be phased out before the Ambassador was launched). Various running changes were also made to the Princess and even though customers still found the car's lack of pace a turn-off and its styling challenging, sales continued running at a reasonable, if unspectacular level. Due to this continuous tinkering by the backroom boys, the Princess did eventually come good even if sales in the UK took a dive in 1979 due to the Iranian crisis.

What Car? magazine tested the 2000HLS in 1980 and were quick to point out that the Princess had undergone a process of subtle improvements and did not hesitate recommending it (with reservations) against a couple of obscure rivals: “...to concentrate on the BL car's faults – and it has all too many, still – would be to ignore its one overwhelming advantage, that of excellent passenger space and ride comfort, unrivalled at the price. It may not be the most prestigious, attractive or advanced alternative available, but for the motorist who places practicality above speed and excitement it must be still the best bet.”

In the post-Austin Metro shake-up of the range, money was released in order to freshen up the Princess. The company knew that in order to maintain sales, nothing less than a serious facelift would be the order of the day. Work began on the project in 1980 and the main intention of the facelift was to give the Princess a hatchback, because BL managers were by now openly admitting that the lack of a fifth door was costing the company sales. Because the reputation of the Princess was just about on the floor by 1980, it was also decided that the facelift would be far-reaching enough to warrant a change of identity – and in the case of the ADO71, a change of gender – from Princess to Ambassador in one fell swoop.

When the Ambassador appeared in March 1982, the extent of the changes took most BL-watchers by surprise; most people expected that such a low-budget makeover would result in only cursory changes to the car – something similar to the transformation that had taken place on the Morris Marina to become the Ital in 1980. But what they actually got was a car that had every body panel changed (barring the outer front door skins), monocoque changes at the rear to accommodate the addition of the tailgate and a vastly different front-end appearance. One of the significant contributors to the new look was the bonnet line, which had been lowered. Harris Mann's styling studio was responsible for the tidy restyle, but what is less known was that there were plans to radically alter the marketing of the car: "Serious consideration was given to re-introducing it as a Wolseley rather than an Austin - and Ray Horrocks was quite keen at one time on an illuminated front badge, whether Wolseley or the Austin-Morris chevron... There was an abiding memory at Longbridge that the Wolseley ADO71 sold better in its 6-month life than the subsequent 2200 HLS ever did..."

The lower bonnet-line was made possible by the fact that there was no need to accommodate the tall E6 series engine. It resulted in an improvement in aerodynamic penetration, but it did mean that the cleverly concealed wipers of the Princess were now lost. Some of the undoubted character of the Princess styling was absent, but it was certainly an effective facelift – and the extra “light” in the C-post eliminated a huge blind spot and contributed to a new and airier interior ambience.

The interior makeover, however, was disappointing. Whereas the 1975 Wolseley Six had superb, multi-adjustable front seats that sported the extravagance of front seats that could be adjusted through 240 positions, the Ambassador made do with far more ordinary cut-priced chairs. The Princess also had a traditional looking, but well-planned dashboard, which was discarded in favour of a low-cost Allegro-esque item in the Ambassador, which not only managed to look and feel cheaper, but also conveyed less information to the driver – even the top of the range VDP version lacked a rev-counter.

Ambassador managed to look different to the Princess, but like just about all end-of-term facelifts of ageing cars, it did not improve on the original. The addition of a hatchback made a vast difference to the practicality of the car and overall, the Ambassador was a useful improvement over the Princess. But by 1982, did anyone care?

The lack of such a basic item as a tachometer reflected the fact that the people behind the car's facelift seemingly did not understand the needs of their clientele. Most professional drivers wanted a car that felt quick and firm to drive – and the Ambassador was neither. One of the biggest criticisms of the Princess was its lack of go and this criticism was not addressed in the Ambassador – its most powerful version was now the twin-carburettor version of the 2-Litre O-series engine, and that could only muster 104bhp. The intended main seller, the 1.7-Litre version could not crack 100mph and its 0-60mph time (always important in bar room conversations) as claimed by the manufacturer was 14.8 seconds. Compare that with the all-conquering Vauxhall Cavalier 1600's 107mph and 10.8 seconds and one can see why people were ignoring the Ambassador in such large numbers.

That was the fundamental problem with the Austin Ambassador, though; it was just not what people wanted.

Luckily, small improvements were made to the suspension system – and if nothing else, the sheer comfort and ride-absorption qualities of the Ambassador demonstrated that Alex Moulton's Hydragas system could be made to work most effectively and the car would stand as a monument to the effectiveness of Moulton's system.

When the Ambassador was discontinued in 1984, to make way for the Austin Montego, it had been in production for barely two years and such was its lack of popularity, that it was not even produced in left-hand-drive form.

Lessons were seemingly learned from the ADO71 and it appeared to BL that mid-range cars should be conservative in order to compete effectively in the fleet market. That was only a single factor. When the Montego first rolled out of Cowley, the company assumed that conservatism for the sake of it would be a winning sales formula; they would be proved wrong. Why the Princess failed was not because of its adventurous styling, its lack of a hatchback or even the fact that it was not fast enough; simply put, it failed because it had a lamentable record for unreliability, which once gained, could not be lost – no matter how hard they tried. If Austin-Morris had built it well from the outset, the story may have been entirely different – but the same could equally be said for so many other cars produced by the company before and since.

Copyright © 2002 Keith Adams.