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Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to examine how different thinkers have made sense of human nature and, in particular, the idea of `free will'. The idea of free will suggests that human nature is distinguished by (amongst other things) a capacity to choose. To put this another way, those who believe in the existence of `free will' assume that the behaviour of human beings is not determined by outside forces. And to the extent that human beings enjoy a degree of autonomy, they are responsible for their actions. However, there are social scientists who radically doubt the existence of `free will', arguing that it is simply a label, like `God' of `Black Hole' used to describe all those external factors and forces which shape behaviour but which have not yet been identified. For example, behaviourists regard the belief in autonomy as an illusion which is an obstacle to the systematic identification of the external determinants which condition behaviour. Against the view of behaviourists, there are other social scientists who believe that, with the exception of the most basic forms of behaviour, human action is not simply the conditioned product of external stimuli. What these social scientists argue is that stimuli are interpreted, and that the content of these interpretations is not wholly determined by previous conditioning. Those who hold this view of human nature believe that an autonomous process of interpretation occurs as individuals render the world meaningful. To be clear, it is accepted that meanings are derived from association from others. But the particular sense of those meanings is understood to be discerned through the exercise of `free will'. An example of this standpoint is symbolic interactionism, so called because individuals are understood to act on the basis of the symbols (e.g. what it means to be masculine or to attend a lecture) which are used to communicate about the world, and thereby to interact with others. Behaviourism
The founders of behaviourism are Pavlov, famous for his salivating dogs, and Watson (1913). As the name suggests, behaviourism concerns itself with behaviour, to the exclusion of consciousness. Terms which imply some degree of autonomy - such as `thinking', `willing', `perceiving', `sensing' - are viewed as `mentalistic'. They simply fail to grasp how any behaviour is only the product of stimuli which trigger responses, the particular form of the response being conditioned by previous patterns of stimulus-response. By identifying these patterns or laws of behaviour, it is believed that behaviour can be programmed to produce whatever responses are desired. Watson (1926:10) proclaimed:
Underlying this view is the understanding that human beings lack the `free will' to resist responding in predictable ways to given stimuli once a particular stimulus-response pattern has been established. Needless to say, if predicted responses are not forthcoming, this outcome is attributed to the existence of patterns which have not yet been identified. It is not taken as evidence of the exercise of free will. Behaviourists understand themselves to have set the study of human behaviour on a scientific foundation which enables them to discover the key to the scientific explanation, prediction and control of human behaviour without recourse to such fanciful, unobservable, notions as `intention', `purpose' or `consciousness'. All these mentalistic notions, it is argued, misrepresent the way in which behaviour which appears to be intended or motivated is actually (that is, according to behaviourists) the product of complex patterns of reinforcement. Skinner gives the example of the playing of a scale by a pianist. This behaviour is not intended, he argues. Rather, like every other behaviour which seems to be willed, it is elicited (stimulated) by the reinforcement which it gives to the musician.
Adopting the model of the `positive' sciences, it is assumed that behaviour, like every other aspect of the world, is the lawful product of cause-effect chains. In the case of human beings, it has been mistakenly assumed that internal states, such as feelings or thoughts, are causes of behaviour when, according to behaviourists, the real causes of both behaviours and their associated states, are patterns of stimuli. More specifically, they are patterns which serve to produce either positive or negative reinforcement for particular behaviours. According to behaviourists, it is pointless trying to change consciousness except by changing the patterns of stimuli and reinforcement which give rise to states of consciousness associated with the responses to these stimuli. Skinner (1953;1971;1976) is perhaps the best known and most influential of the behaviourists. This is because he has taken the ideas of behaviourism out of the lab and into the world, arguing that their application could massively reduce the toll of human misery. For much of this misery, Skinner suggests, arises from the mistaken believe that human beings are free, and that they must be punished when they `freely' err from socially acceptable behaviour. However, before this radical reform can be achieved, people must discard their traditional, `prescientific' view of the relationship between human nature and the environment. Instead of understanding human beings to act intentionally upon the environment, it is necessary to grasp how the environment determines human behaviour, including the sensations which are mistakenly perceived as intentions. Skinner contrasts the traditional view, where individuals are understood to make choices, to be responsible for these choices, and to be rewarded or punished accordingly with a scientific view in which
Given this understanding of the relationship between human beings and their environment, it is not surprising that one of Skinner's book's is titled Beyond Freedom and Dignity. This is because a basic message of Behaviourism is that human beings are deluded in understanding themselves to have the control associated with the belief in autonomy. This autonomy is illusory, or so Behaviourists argue, because, in reality, what human beings do is an outcome of prior material and psychological conditioning. How, then, do they explain the existence of this illusion which exerts such a powerful influence upon us? According to Skinner, we (mistakenly) believe in the idea of autonomy for two reasons. First, because it appears to be expressed as we control the forces of nature and society upon us. These forces, it seems, constrain our autonomy. As these constraints are removed or subdued, autonomy or freedom is experienced. Second, the idea of autonomy is flattering or, as Skinner puts it, `it confers reinforcing privileges' (ibid :209). It provides us with a comforting belief in our own willful capacity to determine our own fate when, according to Behaviourists, our fate is sealed by the conditioning of the environment. The belief in autonomy is said to have very negative consequences. Because individuals are understood to exercise their `free will', they are punished if they fail to conform whereas, from a the standpoint of the Behaviourist, the more rational course of action would be to remove the stimuli which evoke such behaviour or, more positively, to introduce stimuli which reinforce more acceptable forms of behaviour. More generally, the mistaken belief in autonomy is associated with rampant individualism : the idea that the essential autonomy of the individual gives him/her a basic right to do as s/he pleases (within the minimal constraints of the law). This individualism Skinner associates with a number of social ill:
Skinner argues that because freedom is associated with the removal of factors which have aversive consequences, it is easy to overlook how constraints can also be created by the use of apparently non-aversive controls. He notes that there are many ways of manipulating people - "winning friends" - which rely upon positive reinforcers, such as flattery, `bread and circuses', piece-rate payment systems etc (ibid :38-9). The bulk of the literature on freedom, Skinner argues, simply fails to grasp the power of more insidious techniques of control based upon positive reinforcement. This is because it conceives of freedom individualistically in terms of the feeling of autonomy associated with the absence of aversive constraints. By concentrating upon the denial of freedom experienced by "slaves", this literature has failed to recognise the effectiveness of positive reinforcements which turn individuals into what Mills (1959) has termed "happy robots":
Furthermore, Skinner argues that the traditional literature on freedom has created a climate of understanding in which any conscious attempt to condition human behaviour is regarded as an attack upon the freedom of the individual. Anyone who sets out to modify human behaviour by changing the environment is `said to be evil' (ibid :45). Yet, as Skinner sees it, all human behaviour is a product of environmental control, and we are deluding ourselves if we believe otherwise. What confronts us is not a choice between more or less control but, rather, between more or less rational forms of control. Currently, Skinner argues, we arrange our environment in a way which is irrational - in the sense that it fails to produce the kinds of behaviours which we desire. This irrationality flows from our misconceptions about human nature and, more particularly, about the effectiveness of negative reinforcement as well as the insidious nature of seemingly benign forms of positive reinforcement (e.g. bread and circuses). What Skinner recommends is `a technology of behaviour'. A technology, that is, which is designed to produce desired forms of behaviour in much the same way that a machine might be designed to produce particular types of widgets. What is required, Skinner argues, is a dispassionate, scientific approach to the redesign of the human environment, an approach which is uncluttered by traditional wishful thinking about the autonomy of human nature:
The possibility of developing a technology of behaviour when effects which were once traced to states of mind are shown to originate in `accessible conditions' (ibid :30). The challenge for mankind, Skinner argues, is to set in motion a rational programme of change which serves to provide positive reinforcements for forms of behaviour which are desired, and thereby eliminates the need for negative (punitive) measures to punish unacceptable behaviour. Some idea of what Skinner has in mind can be gained by reading Walden Two, a novel which he wrote in 1948 about a commune in which the technology of behaviourism is systematically applied. In this commune, all work is shared, everyone's behaviour is controlled by the principles of behaviourism and everyone is happy. Everyone is made to feel free because this feeling is desired even though, for the planners of the Skinnerian utopia, this feeling is an illusion conjured out of the principles of behavioural engineering. Before noting a number of criticisms of Behaviourism, it may be helpful to summarise its basic premises:
A number of criticism can be levelled at Behaviourism, a number of which are implicit in Symbolic Interactionism, to be discussed below. First, we may question whether Skinner's concept of the environment is adequately formulated. How is the environment identified by Behaviourism? Does it seem likely that its techniques are rich enough to appreciate the complexity and dynamics of the social world? Relatedly, we may ask whether we can gain access to this environment except through our conceptualisation of it. And, if this is so, whether Behaviourism simply enacts the environment in such a way that its own assumptions are confirmed. As we noted earlier, Behaviourism will always attribute limited successes in its attempts to condition behaviour to a failure to identify all the cause-effect chains. Second, we may ask how, if we lack freedom of choice, how can we `decide' to accept his ideas, including his recommendations for the redesign of our environment? The only answer consistent with his thinking is that our prior conditioning will lead us to recognise its value. However, this suggestion seems to be contradicted by Skinner's opinion that most (if not all of us) are labouring under the illusion of human autonomy, and illusion which will surely make us highly resistant (aversive) to his programme. Third, we may ask who is to take control of the redesign of the environment? Skinner's answer is that `we' are. But who, more precisely, is this `we'? How is the democratic control of the redesign process to be accomplished prior to the introduction of the behavioural technology which, presumably, would guarantee democracy. Chomsky (1970), for example, has argued that the effect of Skinner's thinking is to provide scientific respectability for programmes of control designed to reinforce the status quo, not to change it. So, although Skinner may personally favour radical reforms, the practical consequences of such thinking are likely, in Chomsky's judgement, to be highly regulative (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973). Fourth, and most fundamentally, we may ask whether because human beings may have an exaggerated sense of their own autonomy (for reasons which Skinner identifies as flattery), this necessarily means that the sense of autonomy is illusory. Simply because the plasticity of human nature requires us to learn from our environment (or be shaped by it, as Skinner would put it), this does not necessarily mean that internal states are merely the product of the environment or that they exert no `autonomous' influence upon behaviour. As we shall see in the following section, there are many social scientists who believe that the understanding of consciousness is critical for the development of an adequate science of human conduct. Symbolic InteractionismAlthough coined and popularised by Herbert Blumer, the basic foundations of `Symbolic Interactionism' were laid by Mead (1934). Symbolic interactionism describes a distinctive approach to the study of human conduct in which attention is focussed upon the role of meaning in mediating the relationship between human beings and their environment. Human beings are understood to act on the basis of the meaning which `things' have for them. These things include ideas and other people as well as aspects of the natural world. Meaning is understood as a content of consciousness comprising symbols which are used as individuals interact with others and with nature. The key point to be grasped is that, with the exception of reflex responses, when we interact with nature or other people, we use words (sounds) which have a symbolic significance, or meaning. From the standpoint of Symbolic Interactionism, our understanding of the world depends upon the meanings imbued in symbols with which we communicate our experience both to others and ourselves. To put this idea most starkly, human beings are seen to live within symbolic universes : our access to the world is mediated (enabled and constrained) by the use of meaningful assemblies of symbols. These assemblies provide us with a particular view of the world (sometimes referred to as a Weltanschauung). For all practical purposes, the world we share with others is the world which is constructed by drawing upon the particular set(s) of symbols. In this way, the world is rendered intelligible to us and to those who share/understand our world-view. Blumer argues that most forms of social science disregard or minimise the momentous significance of the symbolic mediation of human beings and their environments. He complains
For Symbolic Interactionists, meaning is of crucial importance in understanding behaviour. Moreover, meaning is understood to be produced and maintained through a process of interaction. From this standpoint it is mistaken to believe that meanings reside either in the things themselves or that they are an expression of internal psychological elements (e.g. attitudes). Rather, the meaning of the thing is continuously negotiated through a process of interaction in which its symbolic significance is formed and reformed. Moreover, this meaning is negotiated through a process of self-reflection and interpretation in which the significance of things is reviewed in the light of existing understandings and current interpretations of the context in which the thing is situated.
Of unique significance for the understanding of human conduct is the capacity of human beings to become self-conscious. Self-consciousness arises, according to the proponents of Symbolic Interactionism, as the individual human being identifies him or herself as a `thing' in the world. This possibility occurs as we recognise that, for others, we are a `thing' in their world. By taking on the role of the other, we are able to form a consciousness of our selves. It should be noted that this sense of self is entirely dependent upon the interaction between the individual and others. Initially at least, our sense of self is derived from our understanding of how others see us. And once we have a sense of self, it becomes possible to interact with oneself as a Me, to employ Mead's terminology. This interaction occurs as consciousness (the I in Mead's terminology) now attends to the newly found element in the world : the Me. In doing so, the Me (the self) is defined and evaluated in terms of the symbols which the I understands significant others to use when interpreting the individual. As the sense of self develops and crystallises, the world is increasingly interpreted in terms of its significance for whatever is of concern to the self. This concern, it should be noted, is acquired through interaction with the group of which the individual is a part. The group which provides the individual with `his unity of self' (Mead, 1934 :154) is characterised by Mead as the Generalised Other. For example, if the self takes on, and accepts, the understanding of itself as an American, a Protestant, a hard-working or thrifty person, etc., then the environment will be scanned and organised in ways which routinely affirm this sense of self. Those aspects of the environment which are not significant for the self are simply screened out of awareness or interpreted in a way that is meaningful in terms of the sense of self which has been derived from others. `By virtue of engaging in self-interaction the human being stands in a markedly different relation to his environment than is presupposed by the widespread conventional view [shared by Behaviourism]. Instead of being merely an organism which responds to the play of factors on or through it, the human being is seen as an organism that has to deal with what it notes...Its behaviour with regard to what it notes is not a response called forth by the presentation of what it notes but instead is an action that arises out of the interpretation made through the process of self-indication' (ibid :14). The crucial point is that, according to Symbolic Interactionists, the human organism does not simply respond passively to stimuli. Rather, it actively and creatively interprets its environment in ways which cannot be reduced to chains of cause and effect. On this account, self-interaction involves an autonomous process in which actions are pursued in the light of a process of interpretation in which the individual defines and assesses the situation. `One has to get inside the defining process of the actor in order to understand his action' (ibid :16). The basic premises of Symbolic Interactionism can be summarised as follows (ibid :50):
As with Behaviourism, a number of criticisms can be levelled against Symbolic Interactionism. First, when examining the process of self-formation and the process of interaction, individuals are curiously disembodied. Little or no attention is given to the materiality of human existence : sensations, feelings, desires and so forth. Second, it is unclear precisely how the Me emerges from the I. There appears to be no explanation of what prompts this process or how it is accomplished. Third, it seems that others' definitions of the self are more or less consistent. At least, there is minimal discussion of how inconsistencies are accommodated. Fourth, it is assumed that the process of interpreting the environment is necessarily structured (and constrained) by a concern to affirm a (uniform) sense of self. There is little exploration of the possibility of engaging in self-interaction which exposes the arbitrary and, in a sense, illusory, boundaries of reality which are maintained by the Me. Fifth, Symbolic Interactionism has almost nothing to say about the historical conditions which are at once a medium and outcome of the process of symbolic interaction. It is criticised for divorcing the study of action from this wider context. For example, Lichtman (1970: 83) has argued that `the channelling of interpreted meanings is class-structured and is formed through lived engagement in the dominant institutions of society which are class-dominated and bear a specific class structure'. DiscussionWhat can be learnt from Behaviourism, Symbolic Interactionism and the criticisms which have been levelled against them. First, it is worth noting how they offer different ways of making sense of human behaviour. Of course, their respective perspectives are by no means novel because they each draw upon and contribute to commonsense understanding. So, it is not unusual to hear explanations of human behaviour which tacitly employ their respective frameworks of interpretation. For example, strike action will be characterised in terms of a predictable response to a given set of contingencies; or it will be described in terms of the `mood' of the workforce, by which is suggested their interpretation of what has happened as `calling for' a withdrawal of their labour. In my view, the value of these perspectives, then, is not so much to challenge fundamentally commonsense conceptions of behaviour but, rather, to clarify and make more systematic the premises upon which commonsense reasoning is routinely based. At the heart of the difference between Behaviourism and Symbolic Interactionism is a disagreement about human autonomy. For Behaviourists, this autonomy is a myth which obstructs the development of a more rational society in which the environment is redesigned to produce the stimuli which will elicit socially desired responses. For Symbolic Interactionists, autonomy is at the very centre of what it is to be human : the ability to interpret stimuli in novel, imaginative ways which cannot be controlled or predicted. From the standpoint of Symbolic Interactionism, the absence of autonomy is the myth. And it becomes a dangerous myth when people set out to design systems of reinforcement which take no account of the power of individuals to interpret them in ways which have counter-productive consequences. The cunning of human reason, it is argued, will inevitably find ways of subverting such systems - for example, by attributing a negative value (or symbol) to those things which Behaviourists take to be positive reinforcers. It seems unlikely that the debate between those who believe in human autonomy and those who doubt it will ever be resolved. Arguably, this is because both accounts are based upon metaphysical assumptions which cannot be conclusively falsified. In my view, this view of the debate invites despair only if there is an expectation that social science will deliver some absolute answers. If, on the other hand, the value of social science is identified in its capacity to clarify and push to their limits commonsense understandings, then the absence of any conclusive answers can only stimulate further debate upon the moral and political legitimacy of the various frameworks which we use to guide our actions in the world. It seems to me that both Behaviourism and Symbolic Interactionism generate valuable insights. In particular, behaviourism encourages us to question a widely held assumption about the autonomy of human beings. It asks us whether we are actually deluding ourselves about the degree of control which we, as subjects, actually exercise. For it is suggested that, when examined `scientifically', it is us who are controlled by the environment. Similarly, Symbolic Interactionism invites reflection upon how our sense of reality is mediated through symbols and, more particularly, how our selves are socially constructed through interaction with others. When examined in this light, our taken-for-granted sense of reality and selfhood is seen to be rather arbitrarily held together by a set of symbols with which we have identified. Beyond Behaviourism and Symbolic InteractionismBoth insights can be illustrated by reference to the writings of Carlos Castaneda. According to Castaneda, his research on medicinal plants led him to meet a Yaqui Indian sorcerer who he calls don Juan. Don Juan challenged both Castaneda's understanding of knowledge and his sense of self by insisting that knowledge of certain plants (e.g. peyote) could only be gained by becoming his apprentice. As Castaneda was to discover, this meant more than simply using these plants; it meant interpreting the experience of using plants in particular ways. Indeed, it meant more than this since, after a number of years as don Juan's apprentice, Castaneda came to the conclusion that the use of these plants was necessary simply to unblock his commonsense ways of making sense of the world, including his sense of autonomy. So, Castaneda's apprenticeship can be used as an illustration of how both Skinner and Blumer are correct in challenging our taken-for-granted sense of self and autonomy. Central to the former was the belief in the objectivity of mundane reality. For don Juan, this reality was simply one way of describing the world (i.e. rendering the world meaningful). In principle, there is no need continuously to privilege this description over other possible descriptions, although this is of course necessary for purposes of communicating with others -especially those who assume that the world of everyday life is the only reality. According to Castaneda, the use of medicinal (psychotropic) plants was to weaken his capacity to maintain a belief in the `out there' reality of everyday life.
This understanding is consistent with the perspective of Symbolic Interactionism insofar as our sense of reality is symbolic (a description). However, in Symbolic Interactionism, there is no exploration of the possibility of any alternative to the reality of everyday life. On the contrary, the identification of the self in terms of this reality, and the reproduction of this reality through the process of self-indication is understood to be an essential and unavoidable feature of social existence. There is no suggestion that this might involve a restricted and ultimately deluded understanding of the self which includes a false sense of autonomy. However, this is precisely what is claimed by don Juan. He argues that the possibilities for human experience and community are closed off prematurely as the individual identifies with a particular set of descriptions about the world and then proceeds to reproduce them:
Without questioning the value of our specific memberships in associating with those who share them, don Juan's own knowledge leads him (and eventually Castaneda) to believe that an alternative reality can be experienced when the endless, routinised flow of perceptual interpretations is stopped. This `stopping' of the world is accomplished through a radical relativisation of this world, both in theory and in practice. For Castaneda, this occurred through a lengthy period of apprenticeship in which, through a variety of experiences, he became convinced of the reality of sorcery - a reality in which, initially, he had not interest and of which he was profoundly sceptical. However, the friendship which formed with don Juan, to whom Castaneda became devoted and implicitly trusted, enabled him to learn a new description (theory) of the world (sorcery) which, in turn, provided him with a different perception of reality (practice). `Stopping the world' occurs when a radically alternative description is learned and perceived which shakes the absolutism ascribed to mundane forms of membership. In Castaneda's case, this was the sorcery description of the world. But it is implied that other radically different descriptions (e.g. religious `cults') could have similar effects. However, the effect of `stopping the world' would only occur only when neither of these descriptions were privileged as the reality. For the world `stops' only when two radically different descriptions serve to cancel each other out, perhaps in a way comparable to the use of koans in Zen Buddhism:
The problem with `dogmatic certainty', according to don Juan, is that it imprisons us within a particular description of the world - a description which encumbers us with a vast array of prejudices and preconceptions, and frequently attributes to us an indefensible degree of personal autonomy. Don Juan's advice to Castaneda is to `erase' his own history `because that would make us free from the encumbering thoughts of other people' (ibid :30). Much of don Juan's advice Castaneda found deeply irritating and offensive. He reports that after his second visit to don Juan he felt `I sincerely felt that his criticisms about my personality had seriously undermined my liking for him'. And yet he could not deny that these criticism had hit their mark. So, although he was unwilling to accept that an old, uneducated Indian could so quickly and skilfully disrupt the preconceptions of a PhD student, the accuracy of his comments did not allow him to dismiss don Juan as `a silly old fogey' (ibid:35). That was Castaneda's dilemma which drove him to visit don Juan repeatedly. On the third visit, don Juan suddenly started singing what Castaneda refers to as `an idiotic Mexican folk song' in a way which obviously mimicked a popular singer. The mimicry was so skilfully accomplished that it made Castaneda laugh (though he had been feeling very frustrated and humiliated by don Juan's failure to take his questioning seriously only moments before). In response to Castaneda's laughter, don Juan observes:
When asked to explain what he meant by this, don Juan answered that Castaneda was like the singer and the people who liked such songs : `conceited and deadly serious about some nonsense that no one in his right mind should give a damn about' (ibid :38). To be clear, don Juan is not suggesting that folk songs are worthless but, rather, that their worth is grotesquely exaggerated by those who become fanatically and seriously absorbed in them. To put this another way, this seriousness reflects a lack of perspective in which the reverse of stopping the world occurs. Don Juan then turns more directly upon Castaneda, accusing him of taking himself and his studies too seriously:
A few moments later, don Juan returns to his theme of losing self-importance:
Self-importance can be related to an exaggerated sense of autonomy and control. Annoyance, don Juan suggests, is indicative of a self-righteousness and desire for control which conceals an underlying weakness of spirit. Castaneda's world-taken-for-granted has the effect of turning him into a `pimp' who `fought the battles of some unknown people' (ibid :73-4). What don Juan meant by this is that Castaneda was simply going along with his existing `membership' of the world. For all his academic learning, he had not really questioned its value or consciously committed himself to it. Put at its simplest, Castaneda stands accused of not taking responsibility for the life he leads, an accusation against which he lacks any substantial defence. To remedy this deficiency, don Juan recommends that Castaneda takes greater account of his mortality and appreciates how so much of his life is taken up with trivia which he takes seriously.
By not attributing undue importance to anything, it then becomes possible to develop a state of detachment in which the value of alternative lines of action, expressing different possible commitments, can be assessed. Describing these lines of action as `paths', don Juan encourages Castaneda to look at every path closely and to choose one which has heart. All paths lead to nowhere (c.f. Talking Heads, `Road to Nowhere), don Juan says, but at every step there are choices between paths which have heart and those which do not. `One makes for a joyful journey; as long as you follow it you are one with it. The other will make you curse your life. One makes you strong; the other weakens you' (Castaneda, 1970 :106-7). According to don Juan's way of knowledge, personal strength arises with the loss of self-importance which is sustained by the illusion of autonomy. Paradoxically, personal power is associated with humility, not with self-aggrandizement. However, in order to attain this power, it is necessary to overcome the (psychological) obstacles which stand in the way, the first of which is the fear associated with `stopping the world'. Understood in this way, the ability to `stop the world' is at once a condition and a consequence of the attaining greater clarity and power to deal with the demands and dilemmas of human existence. Summary and ConclusionBehaviourism and Symbolic Interactionism are informed by different metaphysical assumptions about human nature. But whereas the former views freedom as a myth, the latter regards it as an essential and inalienable feature of human existence. A number of criticisms can be levelled at both perspectives. Against Behaviourism is can be argued that its denial of autonomy is asserted rather than demonstrated since any possible evidence of autonomy is interpreted as indicative of our incomplete knowledge of cause-effect chains. Turning to Symbolic Interactionism, this may be criticised for its failure to explain how and why self-consciousness emerges. It also seems to make the implausible assumption that the Me is a unified entity, and to deny the possibility of interacting with the world except through its symbols. Both perspectives have been criticised for their failure to incorporate an appreciation of the political character of behaviour and interaction. And, in this sense, they stand accused of providing an implicit support of the status quo. By drawing upon Castaneda's report of his apprenticeship to don Juan, a Yaqui sorcerer, it has been argued that Castaneda's apprenticeship revealed to him both the constructed nature of his reality (and identity) and the misleading sense of autonomy (in the form of self-importance) associated with his membership. Don Juan's way of knowledge suggests that the seriousness with which Castaneda views himself and his sense of reality is highly debilitating. In its place, don Juan urges him to follow a `path with heart' in which lines of action are pursued in the knowledge that each `path' ultimately leads nowhere, but that some paths are more or less consistent with the very limited degree of autonomy and responsibility which human beings are able to exercise over their fleeting existence. This paradoxical quality of simultaneously knowing that everything is unimportant, and treating things as if they are important without exaggerating their importance, don Juan calls the `controlled folly' with which `a man of knowledge' follows `a path with heart':
In common with Skinner, the teachings of don Juan suggest that dignity is associated with a mistakenly exaggerated belief in autonomy. However, these teachings do not deny the existence of autonomy. Rather, they suggest that the power to make an autonomous choice of a path with heart (rather than drift along with the crowd) is associated with the inclination and the opportunity to realise that no paths go anywhere and, in the light of this revelation, to control the folly of human existence by taking responsibility for acting as if they do lead somewhere. However, the teachings of don Juan do not tell us how such inclinations and opportunities are formed. To put this another way, the teachings does not extend to reflecting upon the historical conditions in which such inclinations and opportunities are stimulated and promoted. In common with Blumer, the teachings confirm that what we take to be objective reality is no more than a description of the world which is learnt and reproduced through interaction with others. However, in Symbolic Interactionism, the necessity of reproducing this description is taken for granted. The autonomy of human beings is understood to be critical for the reproduction of social reality. In the form of reflection, it is mobilised continuously to maintain our taken-for-granted sense of reality. Without this autonomy, human action would be restricted to reflexive behaviour. Where the teachings go beyond Blumer is in the suggestion that, in the absence of controlled folly, this autonomy actually denies its own powers. That is to say, it becomes forgetful of its critical role in constructing reality and, as it were, loses control over this process. In don Juan's terms, it fails to appreciate the folly involved in treating its constructions as if they were objective realities and, as a consequence, loses control of its folly. So, although Blumer appreciates the presence of autonomy, in contrast to Skinner who could be accused of throwing out the baby (freedom) with the bath water (an inflated sense of autonomy), he does not explore how this autonomy may be expressed either positively or negatively. Positively, in a way which renders its folly transparent and holds out the possibility of pursuing `a path with heart'. Or negatively by denying this folly as the world from which it draws its precarious sense of identity is solidified, a solidification which is reflected in an exaggerated sense of self-importance evident in feelings of annoyance when circumstances fail to confirm the symbolic universe in which are selves have become unreflectively embedded. ReferencesBlumer, H. (1969), Symbolic Interactionism, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall Chomsky, N. (1970), `Recent Contributions to a Theory of Innate Ideas' in L. Hudson,ed., The Ecology of Human Intelligence Castaneda, C. (1970), The Teachings of don Juan, Harmondsworth : Penguin Castaneda, C. (1973), A Separate Reality, Harmondsworth : Penguin Castaneda, C. (1974), Journey to Ixtlan, Harmondsworth : Penguin Lichtman, R.T. (1970), `Symbolic Interactionism and Social Reality', Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 15 : 75-94 Mead, G. H. (1934), Mind, Self and Society, The University of Chicago Press Mills, C. W. (1959), The Sociological Imagination, Penguin : Harmondsworth Skinner, B.F. (1953), Science and Human Behaviour, New York : Macmillan Skinner, B.F. (1971), Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Harmondsworth : Penguin Skinner, B.F. (1976), Walden Two, New York : Macmillan Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young,J. (1973), The New Criminology, London ; Routledge and Kegan Paul Watson, J. B. (1913), `Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It', The Psychological Review, 20 :158-177 Watson, J.B. (1926), `Experimental Studies on the Growth of the Emotions', in C. Murchinson, ed., Psychologies of 1925, Worcester, Mass. : Clark University Press General Reading* For a discussion of Behaviourism and Symbolic Interactionism, see E.E. Cashmore and B. Mullan (1983), Approaching Social Theory, London: Heinemann * For a discussion of the broader relevance of Castaneda's work, see D. Silverman (1975), Reading Castaneda, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul * For critical discussions of the authenticity of Castaneda's work, see R. de Mille (1978), Castaneda's Journey, London : Abacus; and R. de Mille (1980), The don Juan Papers, Santa Barbara : Ross Erikson
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